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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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and ... the Allies themselves. Roosevelt travelled to Yalta in the last
forlorn hope that there he might be able to find strong enough words,
oaths, anathernae by which he could stop this Russian avalanche. He was
prepared to grasp at any straw. At that moment Churchill might well
have turned to him with a sad smile . . . Tu I"as voulu^ George Dandin...
Tu Vas voulu . . . And it was too late. At Teheran there had still
been the alternative of forgiving Hitler and returning to the Europe
of Versaille, with Russia and Germany thoroughly exhausted. But
now Stalin was able to convince the partners that there was no other
choice but to fall in with his plan. And Japan was as yet unbeaten . . .
A map of Europe,, the war fronts clearly indicated, was spread on the
wall facing the conference table of the Big Three in the Tsarist palace
at Yalta. The surface occupied by the Red Army, where no Allied corres-
pondent was allowed to move freely, where the issue of the meagre news
was supplied exclusively by Russian controlled radio, at that time entirely
or partially covered twelve countries—from Norway and Finland on the
north to the borders of Greece on the south, nearly three-quarter
million square miles, where over one hundred million people had been
living at the outbreak of war. The arrows on the map showed the progress
of the Red Army in its inarch towards Berlin, and others indicated the
presence of this army on the south of the Balkans and in Northern Norway
where across the water lay Britain. ... It is justifiable therefore to
assume that had those same proposals put by Molotov to Hitler five
years previously, been forwarded by their host at Yalta, Churchill and
Roosevelt would have been more than disconcerted. Whatever arguments
they might choose to forward against such a request would have carried
little weight, since at that particular time the Red Army was advancing
swiftly onwards, while the Allies themselves were only scaling the outer
defences of the Siegfried Line.
The main topic of the Conference was to be the acceleration of the
victory and the design for the re-organisation of Europe and Asia when
Japan had fallen, although after the Teheran defeat, contrary to Russia,
neither Great Britain nor America had any clear vision as to how they
would exploit the victory. Furthermore, Stalin, at that very moment,
possessed the means to compel his partners to reckon with his intentions,
His assets were—he could., if he so wished, cease fighting against Germany
at any time and moreover he was in a position to destroy the existing
status of the Mediterranean area. The Russo-Bulgarian forces could
reach the shores of the Aegean Sea, Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara
within a few days5 and occupy Macedonia, Thrace , . . those same points
on the Turkish shores which thirty years before France and Britain had
promised to Russia in the secret treaty of 1915. And there was also
Bulgaria's endeavour to gain an outlet through Greek territory to the
Aegean Sea. Thus, at a move from the Kremlin the dream of Russian